En este trabajo se analiza el recurso a la escatología y al universo profético-apocalíptico de orientación antiliberal durante la consumación de la independencia de México, en 1821. Las diversas fuentes impresas utilizadas revelan la importancia que adquirieron los discursos sibilinos en la transición del virreinato al Imperio, así como su potencial movilizador. Se argumenta que estos sirvieron para denunciar el liberalismo revolucionario, fomentar la alternativa emancipadora y proponer lecturas mesiánicas renovadas. A través de esos tres aspectos se exploran las posibilidades (...) del pensamiento escatológico y del marco profético a la hora de comprender los cambios político-religiosos del periodo de las independencias iberoamericanas. (shrink)

Los procesos migratorios suponen repensar las relaciones, tránsitos y vivencias de las comunidades receptoras. En este sentido, el análisis de los escenarios de convivencia urbana implica redescubrir las historias viejas y nuevas de la inmigración, de la construcción del barrio, de la conformación de sus actores colectivos y de los espacios urbanos comunes. En el análisis de los escenarios de convivencia más conflictivos, encontramos giros discursivos que buscan responsabilizar a la inmigración reciente de problemáticas estructurales que se viven como irremediables. (...) Otros discursos, tendientes a la indiferencia respecto a la convivencia, muestran un potencial conflicto que vuelve inestables estas posturas. El escenario de convivencia social parece construirse desde acciones que buscan la implicación e interrelación entre los actores, desde el conocimiento y reconocimiento de las diferencias y con acento en los derechos comunes. (shrink)

Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam ( 1967 ) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. But because function constrains possible physical realizers, this empirical bet is far less favorable than it might initially have seemed, especially when we take on board the richer picture of neural and brain function that neuroscience has been uncovering (...) over the past forty years, in which all sorts of brain activities play crucial roles beyond all-or-nothing electrical signaling. Because of its evolutionary history, the brain’s metabolic and informational processes are inextricably intertwined. The resulting complex integrated functions impose more constraints on possible realizers than the clean, single-purpose functions usually cited as examples in discussions of multiple realizability—with ramifications for the functionalist and computationalist foundations of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that helps us better understand some of the most fundamental issues in philosophy: those having to do with the relationship between the meaning of words, the way the world is, and our knowledge of the meaning of words. This selection of new essays by some of the world's leading authorities in this field sheds fresh light both on foundational issues regarding two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. Contributors: Richard Breheny, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Martin (...) Davies, Gareth Evans, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Josep Maci`, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Christopher Peacocke, James Pryor, Francois Recanati, Scott Soames, Cara Spencer, Robert Stalnaker, Kai-Yee Wong, Stephen Yablo. (shrink)

Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...) norms of agnosticism, where the first one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument and the second one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about one of the premises of a valid argument. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked (...) at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives. (shrink)

How does rationality bind the agnostic, that is, the one who suspends judgment about whether a given proposition is true? In this paper I explore two alternative ways of establishing what the rational requirements of agnosticism are: the Lockean–Bayesian framework and the doxastic logic framework. Each of these proposals faces strong objections. Fortunately, however, there is a rich kernel of requirements of agnosticism that are vindicated by both of them. One can then endorse the requirements that belong to that kernel (...) without thereby committing oneself to the problematic implications that stem from either of the aforementioned proposals. (shrink)

Let T be any logical truth. Does the subject know that T (any random subject)? It is not rational for any subject to believe that they don’t, whoever they are. Similarly, it is not rational for them to believe that their evidence doesn’t support T, and it is not even rational for them to believe that they don’t believe that T. It is not rational for anyone anywhere at any time to believe that they don’t know that T. Such are (...) the conclusions arrived at in this paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic InjusticesRosa Ritunnano, MD (bio) and Ian James Kidd, PhD (bio)Hermeneutical injustice as a concept has evolved since its original formulation by Miranda Fricker (2007). The concept has been taken up in psychiatry, with its moral, epistemic and clinical premium on the interpretation of extremely complex and difficult experiences (Kidd et al., 2022). There are many varieties of hermeneutical injustice with different forms, sources, degrees, (...) effects, and interpersonal and socio-structural aspects (Medina, 2017). José Eduardo Porcher has proposed the addition of a new form of ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustice, with a case study of psychotic symptoms involving religious content.He offers different characterizations of this injustice:a particularly radical form of injustice, namely, having their own interpretation of their experiences unjustifiably undermined.a form of hermeneutical injustice that occurs when a patient diagnosed with psychosis is denied the opportunity of interpreting their own experiences within their own religious framework.These are different things. Denying someone the opportunity to interpret their experiences in their own, preferred framework is one way of undermining their interpretations. Another is forcing someone to use your own preferred framework and then belittling their own, which seems doubly wrong. Misusing some preferred interpretive framework can be as unjust as not using it. The two definitions could be combined, but then much will depend on what it means to undermine someone’s interpretation of an experience. We think there is a form of radical hermeneutical injustice—different to the one described by Porcher. Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism. In these cases, one person cannot regard someone’s interpretive framework as coherent or intelligible (one that involves supernatural entities, for instance).Most discussions of hermeneutical injustice focus on social structures. Fricker notes structural dimensions to hermeneutical injustice. In a standard case, a group has unequal participation in collective practices for making and using interpretive resources (Ritunnano, 2022). In a rich analysis, José Medina describes four ‘axes’ or dimensions for distinguishing forms of hermeneutical injustice [End Page 235] (Medina, 2017). The source of these injustices can be semantic or performative. The dynamics may be structural or interpersonal, or both. Moreover, there are different degrees of breadth and depth, defined here in terms of the ‘reach’ of the injustice across one’s life, and the depth of damage to one’s hermeneutic agency, respectively (Medina, 2017, p. 45). On this model, what might count as ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustices? Deep and broad hermeneutical injustices can be radical when they are very broad in scope and very deeply damaging. This might be what Porcher has in mind. But we think there is a further option, relevant to his case study.Porcher focuses on a case where individuals experience unusual beliefs and perceptions with religious content receive a ‘psychosis’ diagnosis. The alleged injustice is that the possibility of a genuine religious experience is not recognized and validated. The example is Femi, a young man with Christian background, who enters the mental health system following the onset of psychotic ‘symptoms’. After being found “disoriented and depleted in public” – tired and undernourished—Femi is compulsorily admitted to hospital, explaining he undertook fasting and isolation in response to orders from God. During this time, Femi devoted himself to Bible reading and stopped going to work. In hospital, where the authenticity of God’s voice is challenged by clinicians, Femi is treated for acute psychosis with pharmacotherapy. While remission of symptoms follow, there is no functional recovery, and Femi is described as “unmotivated and apathetic”.Femi interpreted his experiences in religious terms, but this interpretation is not accepted or pursued by the clinicians. Is this a hermeneutical injustice? If so, is it a ‘radical’ one? Granted, Femi’s religious interpretation may be psychologically adaptive—enhancing his sense of life as meaningful (Ritunnano & Bortolotti, 2022). But this is consistent with it being a hermeneutical injustice. Plus, a religious framing may be conducive to his functional recovery after being discharged, especially in conjunction with a supportive religious community, able to help him articulate, understand, and respond to those religious experiences (see Cottingham, 2005; Wynn, 2005). However, none of... (shrink)

If a human subject knows they are being measured, this knowledge may affect their attitudes and behaviour to such an extent that it affects the measurement results as well. This broad range of effects is shared under the term ‘reactivity’. Although reactivity is often seen by methodologists as a problem to overcome, in this paper I argue that some quite extreme reactive changes may be legitimate, as long as we are measuring phenomena that are not simple biological regularities. Legitimate reactivity (...) is reactivity which does not undermine the accuracy of a measure; I show that if such reactivity were corrected for, this would unjustifiably ignore the authority of the research subject. Applying this argument to the measurement of depression, I show that under the most commonly accepted models of depression there is room for legitimate reactivity. In the first part of the paper, I provide an inventory of the different types of reactivity that exist in the literature, as well as the different types of phenomena that one could measure. In the second part, I apply my argument to the measurement of depression with the PHQ-9 survey. I argue that depending on what kind of phenomenon we consider depression to be, we will accept different kinds of reactivity. I show that both under the harmful dysfunction model and the practical kinds model, certain reactive changes in measuring depression are best seen as legitimate recharacterizations of the underlying phenomenon, and define what legitimate means in this context. I conclude that in both models, biological aspects constrain characterization, but the models are not so strict that only one concept is acceptable, leaving room for reactivity. (shrink)

In this text, we propose to examine the ways in which Nancy’s thought of catastrophe, indebted to Heidegger’s questioning of ontology and its history, embarks on a reading of the contemporary world marked by the passage of the “with” (Mitdasein) from the existential plane to the plainly categorial one. Thus, the ontological constitution of the existing slides into pure juxtaposition, as this appears in his analysis of the “proliferation of ends” and their incessant transformation into means.We also dedicate our attention (...) to the ruin, saturation and rupture of the “construction” model. It is in the infinitization of each and every action, through the unpredictable technical architecture in the base of its design, that the catastrophic penetrates the world with its constitutive multiplicity and the state of “suspension” that defines it. The life of waste in its dispersion is exemplary in this context: the catastrophe thus unfolds in lapses thrown into the environment and the psyche of the subjects, something that can be seen as the introjection of the temporality of struction.The anomie that today shelters the catastrophes that intertwine before our eyes, apparently “scandalous” in a paradigm of action, takes place in a «present that never fulfills itself as presence» (Nancy) and that finds itself in the impossibility of expressing the meaning of the world. The disorder of struction, which characterizes what some inappropriately call the Anthropocene, does not happen as a reversal or a destruction of an order, but rather as a disconnection of the imperative character of the order. From this question, a discussion opens on the meaning of the community that is on the verge of catastrophe. (shrink)

The strong influence of pragmatism in the early 20th-century international debate, its subsequent and apparently inexorable decline, and its recent revival are intertwined with the fate of other currents of thought that have marked the development of contemporary philosophy. This volume clarifies the most recent events of this development focusing on key theoretical issues common both to American classic philosophical tradition and analytical thought. Many essays in this volume belong to what we can call “new” pragmatism, namely a pragmatist perspective (...) that is different from the postmodernist “neo” pragmatism à la Rorty. The volume shows that both pragmatists and analytic thinkers stress the importance of logic and scientific method in order to deal with philosophical problems and seek for a clarification of the relation between our ethical values and our understanding of natural facts. Moreover, the anti-skeptic attitude that characterizes pragmatism as well as most part of analytic philosophy, and their common attention to the problems of language and communication are emphasized. The more sophisticated tools for addressing both theoretical and methodological problems developed by analytic philosophy are pointed out, and the essays show the possible integration of these two forms of speculation that, for too a long time, mutually disregarded one another. (shrink)

Sándor Márai: Consciousness of Reality, Creator of History shows the way Márai builds a series of characters based on Divorce in Buddha, instead of the concept of historical novel. Thanks to their connection between consciousness and reality, these characters are able to recognize themselves in the confessional space and they are regarded as representatives of unofficial history.

In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less (...) empirically risky. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System in November 1999. The report focused public attention on the errors that occur within the medical system that cause death and harm to patients. It outlined a series of changes for health care that are aimed at reducing these errors by 50 percent over the next five years. This paper examines the problem of medical mistakes historically. It documents how legal, scientific, and medical trends during (...) the years 1890Ð1934 intersected to effect the reporting of mistakes in the subspecialty of neurosurgery. At the start of this time frame, mistakes were reported openly in journal articles as an educational tool. By its end, however, mistakes had gone ÒundergroundÓ and were buried amid a more objective, scientific reporting system. Using this historical perspective as a baseline, the paper concludes by re-examining the IOMÕs suggestions for change and comments on what they mean for the culture of medicine. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteur examine le naturalisme de James comme un exemple des intersections entre la biologie, la psychologie et la philosophie. L’article reconstruit les principaux arguments épistémologiques, éthiques et métaphysiques de James pour montrer comment sa philosophie s’inscrit dans la biologie de Darwin. Ainsi, le contingentisme de James devient cohérent avec sa critique de l’interprétation du principe darwinien de la « sélection naturelle » et avec l’idée de Darwin de l’ambiguïté comme marque de la réalité physique et humaine.

En el presente trabajo se reflexiona sobre la situación de pobreza y desigualdad que asola al mundo en este nuevo siglo señalando el papel que desarrolla la Universidad en el cambio social y en la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible. Las Universidades se enfrentan a un gran desafío, contribuir a la creación de un mundo sostenible e igualitario. La Educación Superior se convierte en guía para una sociedad que necesita, hoy más que nunca, de una conciencia crítica que (...) les haga actuar desde la responsabilidad socy el compromiso ético. En esta investigación, se expone un caso concreto, la asignatura de Educación para Responsabilidad Social impartida en la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria como una materia que ayuda a los estudiantes a implicarse personalmente para lograr la justicia social y el bien común, trabajando activamente para incidir en el logro de los ODS. (shrink)

O principal objetivo desse texto é apresentar um quadro geral da relação da filosofia de Giambattista Vico com a Nápoles do período do século XVIII. Os principais tópicos em discussão tratam da relação de Vico com o renascimento, com o barroco, com as principais mudanças das concepções científicas e as academias napolitanas, com a Igreja e com o agitado ambiente político. Para esse estudo, foram consideradas as suas primeiras obras, De ratione e De antiquissima, sua autobiografia e sua obra principal, (...) a Scienza nuova. Apoiados nos principais estudiosos e comentadores de Vico, pretendeu-se elaborar um panorama do contexto em que ele estava inserido e buscou-se interpretar como isso participou de sua teoria filosófica. (shrink)

Volume 39 of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values includes lectures initially scheduled during the academic year 2019-2020. Owing to the global coronavirus pandemic, some were delivered at a later date. The Tanner Lectures are published in an annual volume. In addition to permanent lectures at nine universities, the Tanner Lectures on Human Values funds special one-time lectures at selected higher educational institutions in the United States and around the world.

This article provides an introductory overview and comparison of the pragmatism of Charles Peirce, the founder of the American movement, with aspects of the pragmatism of disciples such as William James, F.C.S. Schiller, and John Dewey, including Peirce’s reactions to these latter thinkers, and some observations on the place of pragmatism in the 21st century.

HR/AL: Professor Taylor, what are you working on these days? CT: Well, several things. One of the things I am working on is something I was lecturing this fall at the New School University, and that I have called ‘modern social imaginaries’. It is an attempt to understand western modernity in terms of the different ways in which people imagine their social existence. These imaginaries are a condition for new kinds of practices that are characteristic of modernity. This research is (...) an internal part of a larger project to understand modern secular civilization, the modern west as a secular civilization. What does that notion exactly mean? What does it amount to? How did it happen? (shrink)